Police Scotland:challenging the current democratic deficit in police governance and public accountability by Loveday, Barry
Crime Prev Community Saf (2018) 20:154–167
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41300-018-0044-9
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Police Scotland: challenging the current democratic 
deficit in police governance and public accountability
Barry Loveday1
Published online: 29 May 2018 
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract This article considers the recent creation of Police Scotland and the 
substitution of local police forces for a national police service ‘Police Scotland’ in 
2013. It assesses the drivers for change and the arguments presented by both poli-
ticians and police professionals in favour of the eradication of all 8 local Scottish 
forces and the creation of a single police force. It contrasts developments in Scotland 
with those in England and Wales where there has been a recommitment to local 
delivery of police services in which local police boundaries have been retained with 
the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners. It considers the police bound-
aries and coterminosity with local authorities and highlights the absence of shared 
boundaries within Police Scotland. It reflects on the removal of local accountability 
in Scotland with the abolition of Police Boards and the creation of a national and 
unelected Scottish Police Authority. It highlights the significance of police planning 
led by senior officers from Strathclyde Police and the impact of this on Police Scot-
land. It raises legitimate questions as to the overall efficacy of a national force made 
answerable to a nationally appointed body, the Scottish Police Authority. Finally, 
it makes a number of recommendations which might go towards someway to re-
establishing a degree of local accountability to communities and local governments 
in Scotland which is now so clearly absent.
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Introduction
As has been noted by academic researchers, there has been in recent years 
a remarkable divergence within the UK in terms of the approach to reforming 
police structures (Fyfe and Scott 2013). In Scotland, the decision was taken 
by the Scottish National Party (SNP) to move to a single service for the whole 
country which in a relatively short period of time led to the amalgamation of the 
remaining eight police forces in Scotland to form Police Scotland (Fyfe and Scott 
2013: 121). This was to involve a decisive break with history and tradition in 
Scottish police administration (Fyfe and Scott 2013: 119).
Most notably this also involved the complete removal of any effective local 
authority role in police service delivery, the immediate result of the abolition of 
local Police Boards. These had, until the arrival of Police Scotland, exercised 
some influence over local policing while also providing limited funding and call-
ing the police to account. The latter responsibilities were, instead, to be relocated 
to the national level. This reflected, as has been argued by observers, a decisive 
move to centralising policing and was fully intended to represent a clear break 
from the past (Fyfe and Scott 2013: 120).
Interestingly and in complete contrast to the Scottish experience, a decision 
was taken south of the border to move in the opposite direction. In England and 
Wales, the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (2011) was designed to 
significantly strengthen local police service delivery while also distinctly enhanc-
ing police accountability (Loveday 2013a, b: 106). The abolition of police author-
ities and the introduction of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners 
(PCCs) appears to have achieved, in the main, the political objectives set for them 
(Loveday 2015a, b: 115). Although still a relatively new development, it is clear 
that PCCs have been able to rebalance the relationship between police chiefs and 
elected officials (Loveday 2015a, b: 116).
This has been in part reflected in the remarkable increase in the turnover of 
chief officers. PCCs have exercised, as demonstrated in the case of the chief con-
stable of Avon and Somerset in 2015, their considerable powers in terms of hir-
ing and requesting the resignation of chief officers. This may also be one conse-
quence of the decision of the Home Office to no longer closely engage with local 
policing which is now considered to be the sole responsibility of chief officers 
and PCCs. This direction of travel, away from increasing centralisation, is set to 
increase as many big cities have opted to introduce directly elected mayors who 
can be expected ultimately to take over responsibility for the local police force. It 
is, however, balanced by a view from the centre that the National Crime Agency 
(NCA) which is directly accountable to the Home Secretary could be expected to 
take on a much wider remit and which will at some point include counter-terror-
ism and all serious-organised crime, on a national basis (Loveday 2013a, b: 100). 
The NCA role is intended to take pressure off local forces so that they no longer 
will be expected to exercise a multi-functional role.
However, it is noticeable that the Home Secretary has had to confront consist-
ent pressure from police associations to introduce police force amalgamations to 
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create either large regional forces or a national police force. Most recently, this 
was to be demonstrated within the Steven’s Report ‘Policing for a Better Britain’ 
(2013) which recommended the abolition of PCCs and the creation of Regional 
Police Boards. It is a matter of interest that Theresa May as Home Secretary 
refused to accede to this professional police objective. At a PSAEW annual con-
ference in 2015, she was indeed, in defence of the new police governance in Eng-
land and Wales, to cite Police Scotland as an example of what could go wrong. 
This demonstrated, she argued, that such restructuring was potentially regressive 
in that it did not generate the savings claimed for it but did serve to undermine 
local accountability (Hickey 2015).
Drivers for change
The observations of the then Home Secretary are of interest. A central argument for 
the introduction of a national police force was to be based on the likelihood of sub-
stantial cuts to police funding and the need to make savings while at the same time 
protecting police establishment. Indeed, the then Chief Constable of Strathclyde was 
to publicly state that a national police force would protect police numbers as a result 
of saving made on infrastructure (Fyfe and Scott 2013: 126).
Subsequently the Scottish Government’s Outline Business Case (OBC) was to 
claim that a national structure would lead to savings of £100 million a year while 
also protecting the ‘magic number’ of 17,234 police officers (Fyfe and Scott 2013: 
126). To date no police restructuring exercise has, in the event, been able to clearly 
demonstrate major savings of the nature and size of that claimed for Police Scotland 
(Loveday 2006: 12). More significantly perhaps, the determination to protect police 
numbers has long ceased to have any traction south of the border either. This is the 
consequence of a growing recognition that it is not police establishment but deploy-
ment of personnel which remains the crucial factor in terms of determining police 
effectiveness (Bayley 1994: 4).
As has been found in England and Wales, for example, the steady and signifi-
cant fall in acquisitive crime has occurred against a background of declining rather 
than increasing police numbers (Loveday 2015a, b: 123). Moreover, the incremental 
nature of the growth of police establishment has also proved to be problematic. This 
was based on an (untested) assumption that more police could be expected to impact 
on the crime rate. Yet, the underlying problem as to what might be either the maxi-
mum or minimum number of police officers needed to provide effective policing 
was never really addressed and remains largely unanswered (Loveday 2006: 328).
It also appears to be the case that, rather unusually, in Scotland professional opin-
ion as to the value of a national force proved to be divided. Many chief constables 
heading up the threatened 8 forces did not share the optimism of either the SNP 
or fellow chief constable of Strathclyde as to the benefits of amalgamation. They 
argued instead for a regional structure to allow for local demands and local differ-
ences. In the event, concerns expressed by these officers were to prove to be fully 
justified as the ‘new model’ police force was to make no allowance for differing 
regional or local interests and priorities.
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Planning a new police structure
Initially planning for the reformed police service was to be the responsibility of 
the Scottish Government. However, in 2011 this was to be devolved to the Scot-
tish Police College where the Sustainable Policing Project Team was located. The 
Team was to be led by a senior police officer, Neil Richardson, who at this time was 
also Deputy Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police (Fyfe and Scott 2013: 125). As a 
result, the reform process was to be largely controlled by the police and I shall argue 
that this was to prove to be a significant factor in its ultimate failure.
Thus two elements were to be exhibited within the project which should have 
exercised the minds of political observers. First, the plans arising from the project 
appeared to demonstrate a traditional police objective which has been, where possi-
ble, to remove their service from effective local oversight and accountability (Reiner 
2010: 227). This has been a long-term feature of police interpretations of effective 
policing. Based on a ‘Professional Policing Model’, it has, as its objective, a signifi-
cant enhancement of police operational autonomy (Reiner 2010: 227).
This feature of ‘police governance’ is not, of course, confined to Scotland. Most 
recently, the Independent Steven’s Independent Commission on policing and future 
police governance in England and Wales was to recommend the immediate aboli-
tion of PCCs, the creation of large regional police forces and the creation of Police 
Boards consisting of indirectly elected councillors. As an example of the search for 
police hegemony, these proposals were difficult to beat (Stevens 2013). They did 
have, however, all the hallmarks of the ‘professional policing’ approach. If imple-
mented, these proposals would have served to resurrect chief officer autonomy while 
strengthening police operational independence (Loveday 2013b).
In Scotland, this outcome was to be achieved by way of the abolition of local 
Police Boards and the absence of any local accountability mechanism within the 
new structure. The identification of local commanders for the 32 district authorities 
might be seen, at best, as a kind of tokenism to the locality as does the requirement 
for both parties to agree a local ‘policing plan’, the significance and status of which 
remains quite uncertain. Thus, for example, under the new model, central direc-
tion from the chief constable, on ‘operational policing grounds’ can be expected to 
override any previously agreed local commitments. As a consequence of that, local 
‘accountability’ to the districts might be best described as being symbolic rather 
than real. Moreover, the police structure developed by the Project Team also ensured 
that there would be no shared boundaries between police and the districts. Thus, 
below the central command, 14 police divisions were established which ensured 
there could be no coterminous boundaries between police divisions and the 32 local 
districts (Fyfe 2014).
Experience of police and community partnerships
This approach provides a clear contrast with police structures south of the border. 
Since the introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998 police forces have 
been encouraged to create coterminous boundaries between police Basic Command 
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Units and local district and unitary authorities. Although recent financial demands 
have placed pressure on this arrangement, the primary aim has been to create a 
closer relationship between local government and the police. The move towards 
coterminous boundaries was interestingly to be given explicit support by the Police 
Superintendents Association (PSAEW 2005).
Police perceptions of the value of local partnerships
In a far-sighted document produced by this association, it was to be argued that the 
single most important factor determining the effectiveness of the BCU was estab-
lishing shared boundaries (PSAEW 2005). This was because it was recognised that 
effective policing could be better achieved through partnerships with other agencies, 
most notably if not exclusively, with local authorities (Loveday 2007). Such was its 
commitment to partnerships the PSAEW was, at this time, to also recommend that 
the local authority should be involved in the selection of the local police commander 
(PSAEW 2005).
Surveys of local commanders undertaken in 2002 to identify the greatest pres-
sures facing them in terms of demand on police resources demonstrated why a part-
nership approach made sense. The responses of local commanders (police superin-
tendents) indicated that while gun crime, organised and violent crime did not loom 
large in terms of their incidence in the BCU area, other problems certainly did. 
These, however, were linked overwhelmingly to ASB-related incidents and alcohol-
driven antisocial behaviour (Loveday and McClory 2007). Local police command-
ers were swamped with problems associated with excessive alcohol use and alcohol-
related disorder. A second survey undertaken in 2007 was to replicate these findings 
and fully supported the PSAEW position that partnership arrangements with other 
agencies could be seen as being a central element to any effective response to the 
problem (Loveday and McClory 2007).
In the absence of any similar survey undertaken in Scotland, it is difficult to make 
any clear comparisons. There must, however, be an assumption that outside of the 
largest conurbations the threat of violent crime is likely to be overshadowed by simi-
lar low level but very frequent ASB- and alcohol-related incidents. This matter does 
go beyond the determination of types of crime dealt with by police forces. It is now 
acknowledged that the problem of public fear of crime has as much, if not more, to 
do with antisocial behaviour as it ever does with ‘crime’. Trying to impact on ASB 
can be viewed, as a result, as providing a major priority for police services through-
out the UK (HMIC 2010; Loveday and McClory 2007).
It is of interest to also recognise that while the PSAEW was to highlight the real-
ity of demands on police managers, elsewhere the police organisational culture con-
tinued to attach an overwhelming importance to violent crime, organised crime and 
gun crime. As long ago as 1990 within the Operational Policing Review of that year, 
it had become evident that these police priorities did not match those of the public 
(OPR Joint Consultative Committee 1990).
Public priorities proved to be much more prosaic relating as they did to ASB, dog 
fouling and young people using public space (OPR 1990). The latter did not exactly 
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capture the imagination of police professionals. Yet the major purpose of police 
reform south of the border has been a rather belated attempt to match up police pri-
orities with those of the public. It has been concluded that as tax payers the public 
has a clear right, after all, to help determine current and future police priorities.
The role and influence of Strathclyde police
A further driver for change emanated from the largest police force in Scotland. 
Strathclyde Police, led by a Chief Constable committed to a national force, (and also 
perhaps an expectation that he might lead it), has had, since regionalisation, within 
even the world of policing a somewhat aggressive image (Fyfe 2014). This went 
back to the early amalgamations of the 1970s which led to the creation of 8 police 
forces within which Strathclyde with over 7000 police officers was far and away the 
largest force with the highest density of population (Davidson et al. 2016).
As has been argued, the push for regional or national police structures in Scot-
land has a long history (Davidson et al. 2016). As long ago as 1966, a motion was 
to be passed at that year’s annual Scottish Police Federation conference in favour of 
nationalising policing in Scotland. Later experience of regionalisation, however, was 
to lead to a rejection by the Federation of any further amalgamations. This reaction 
arose particularly sharply in the Strathclyde region, where the police force embraced 
the urban conurbations of Clydeside, the mining areas of Lanarkshire and also the 
rural areas of Argyllshire and the islands (Davidson et al. 2016).
As was to be argued by the first Chief Constable of the region, David McNee, 
there were clear tensions between the need for ‘standardisation and that of flexibil-
ity’ (Davidson et al. 2016). Experience of Strathclyde was to result by 1976 in the 
Police Federation ending its support for the creation of a single Scottish service. It 
was reported that the Federation Secretary had stated that this could be expected 
to be ‘an even greater disaster than regionalisation has proven to be’ and that ‘it 
was very hard to police an area like Mull and have the same policy in the East End 
of Glasgow’ (Davidson et  al. 2016). As the same authors note in relation to this 
experience:
Arguably, the matter was not helped by the decisions that were made to roll 
out what had been the Glasgow City model across the new Strathclyde polic-
ing area (Davidson et al. 2016).
As has been argued, Glasgow’s City Police were always subject to greater internal 
structural and procedural change than elsewhere. This was to mean that when the 
city’s working practices were implemented across the region, change was to prove 
much greater than ever experienced in the more rural regional forces. Not for noth-
ing was the new Strathclyde Police region to be dubbed by many officers as ‘Strath-
Glasgow’ (Davidson et  al. 2016). This experience has an immediate application 
for the introduction of Police Scotland. Thus, the same ‘Strath–Glasgow’ model 
imposed in that region has now in effect been expanded to include the whole of 
Scotland. Interestingly, in this context, the same authors note of the roll-out of the 
Strath-Glasgow model that:
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Interviews do suggest that the introduction of any new policing model needs 
to be sufficiently flexible to recognise differences in local cultures and local 
needs whatever the larger structures, labels or identities that are formally set in 
place (Davidson et al. 2016).
Some evidence of the impact of the roll-out of Strathclyde Police practices to the 
rest of Scotland has been provided by a local observer, who as secretary to the Fed-
eration’s northern branch formerly served in the scrapped Northern Constabulary. 
He has noted how a significant change in operational policing took place ‘on the 
basis of a few lines in a very large document’ and stated that he was opposed to the 
idea that ‘armed response officers were being deployed to deal with routine inci-
dents’ He added that:
At no stage did anyone envisage that the consequence of that would be officers 
walking about with pistols strapped to them at fetes and charity events. That 
is a significant change and the unwillingness to accept the sensitivities that 
provoked showed a disregard for the community I represent and was also ill-
judged about what is required (Police Oracle 2015a).
A similar problem was to be experienced in relation to recent use, by Police Scot-
land, of stop and search powers. It was to be discovered following the roll-out of 
Police Scotland that ‘police carrying guns used stop and search 8000 times in just 
1 year’ and that this represented 150 searches being conducted every week by offic-
ers carrying guns on routine duties’. Although the chief constable later removed all 
armed officers from routine duties, it was argued that at any moment, without notice 
and without consultation, ‘the decision could be reversed’ and that this was known 
‘because that was what had happened before’ (Police Oracle ibid 2015b).
Unfortunate incidents involving a death in police custody and an undetected road 
accident on the M9 only appeared to further highlight problems surrounding a more 
centralised police system where saving appeared to have been achieved by the clo-
sure of local police call centres. It led to a former politician to claim that Police 
Scotland had proved to be ‘one of the worst performing police forces in history’. 
The same spokesman was to add that it was unlikely that the appointment of either 
a new chief constable or chair of the Scottish Police Authority would be sufficient 
to address the depth of the problems ‘stemming from over-centralisation’ (Police 
Oracle 2015c).
Responding to the problem
Although contested by the Scottish Government, which remains wedded to the cur-
rent structure of Police Scotland, it is apparent that this model has significant flaws. 
Not the least of these is the complete removal locally of any community involvement 
into policing the immediate result of the abolition of the Police Boards. The prob-
lem has been compounded by the decision to establish a national police authority, 
the SPA, whose membership was to be based on appointment rather than election. 
Indeed, this development only offers a further contrast to those implemented south 
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of the border where direct election, for better or worse, has now assumed an ever 
greater significance (Mawby and Smith 2013).
The Scottish police authority
In addition to this, the SPA has exercised the limited powers accorded to it with 
considerable caution. In doing so, it appears to have only replicated the experience 
of police authorities in England and Wales (Reiner 2010: 228). One way forward 
in resolving the problem of SPA membership could therefore be to revise the cri-
teria for membership. Given the role which it has been given (although perhaps 
failing to exercise), it could in future consist of members drawn from each of the 
local districts. While a membership of 32 councillors might be unwieldy, it would, 
at least, provide greater legitimacy while providing an effective channel for local 
representation.
Need for decentralisation
The need for further internal reform has indeed been recently recognised in order to 
heighten the SPA’s legitimacy and relevance (Malik 2017). However, the absence of 
local district representation remains a matter of concern. As a result, local District 
engagement by way of membership of the SPA may offer the best way forward and 
would be a significant addition to just agreeing a local policing plan, which remains 
of doubtful value, at district level.
Some form of devolution it is argued is now clearly necessary. This might also 
go beyond ‘regionalisation’ to re-engage local communities. However, it remains of 
interest that in the referendum conducted in June 2011 it was to be discovered how 
limited the appeal of a national police force was to the public ‘with most respond-
ents preferring a regional structure’ (Fyfe and Scott 2013: 126). A case has already 
been made for the creation of four ‘regional force areas’ with quasi-autonomous 
powers which could be established under the overall control of one chief constable 
in order to ‘decentralise policing’ (Police Oracle 2015c).
Failure of police leadership
An admission of the degree of failure of the current national model has in fact 
already been made by the Scottish Government’s First Minister. In a recent 
announcement Nicola Sturgeon has stated that, following the early departure of 
Stephen House the next chief constable would be required to face what were to be 
described as ‘local accountability panels’ in response to the evident democratic defi-
cit occasioned by the introduction of Police Scotland (Police Oracle 2015d). Sadly 
his successor as chief constable of Police Scotland, Phil Gormley, has already been 
placed on ‘special leave’ and will not, after all, be able to fulfil those requirements.
It might be argued therefore that if local accountability panels are to be the future 
vehicle of accountability there is a case for either re-establishing the local Police 
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Boards or giving the proposed panels the powers exercised earlier by these bod-
ies. In their absence, the panels could become little more than talking shops. They 
need to have some authority and that is only derived from the exercise of budget-
ary (and other) powers. As argued by the leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats 
in response to the growing crisis surrounding operational policing undertaken by 
Police Scotland:
A police force with no democracy is no police force for a democracy and the 
relationship between communities and police need to be strengthened (Police 
Oracle 2015b).
Identifying the value of local policing
The same spokesman might also have added that the relationship of the police to 
the community remains a vital element in sustaining the overall effectiveness of the 
police. This is because the police remain overwhelmingly dependent on informa-
tion being given to them by the communities they police. It is this feature of polic-
ing rather than police specialisation that largely dictates police performance. This 
dependency is perhaps best summarised by Reiner who has noted that:
The major findings of studies of the process by which crimes are cleared up 
is that the prime determinant of success is information immediately provided 
by members of the public (usually the victim) to patrol officers or detectives 
when they arrive at the scene of the crime. If adequate information is provided 
to identify the culprit fairly accurately the crime will be resolved; if not, it is 
almost certain not to be (Reiner 2010: 119–200).
The need for good community links to generate information which can be of value 
to the police has most recently been again emphasised against the background of 
potential terrorist activity. Commenting on the fact that in Paris the Police National 
has never sought to establish a community dialogue with ethnic communities, one 
police officer was to state that in France, ‘Police do police work and it is not my job 
to play football with the kids in the communities’ (Connett and Forrester 2015). It 
may have been that failure which demonstrated the limitations of this approach. It 
may also explain why the Paris terrorist attack proved to be such a surprise to the 
police.
In London, the situation may well be different not least because of the level of 
intelligence collected by PCSOs deployed in many of the potentially most problem-
atic communities. It has been recently argued that PCSO intelligence now provides 
the basis within the MPS for its daily intelligence briefings, and these are delivered 
to response and proactive police units across London (Loveday and Smith 2014). 
Here, the diverse backgrounds of PCSOs and their ready availability for visible 
patrol appear to significantly add to their intelligence function.
Encouraging community engagement may well provide a greater advantage 
over investment in police specialisms. Specialisation has, by way of high abstrac-
tion rates, served to remove ever greater numbers of warranted officers from general 
policing and patrol activity. Specialisation can therefore come at a potential cost in 
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terms of community relations (Loveday 2007: 14). Yet, a recent defence of Police 
Scotland has proved to be its ability to support greater specialisation. Thus, the Scot-
tish Government has argued that a single service had both removed artificial bar-
riers of previous force areas and a major benefit was seen to be to ‘provide better 
access to specialist services and equipment than ever before’ (Police Oracle 2015c). 
Whether this gain matches the loss of both local identity and contact with the com-
munity might be contested.
Organisational change
Further restructuring could be potentially destabilising. Yet the extreme nature and 
extent of the organisational dysfunction exhibited by Police Scotland requires fur-
ther consideration in terms of how, in future, police services might be better deliv-
ered. Evidence suggests that local police forces are best able to provide both local 
visible policing and reassurance to communities (Loveday and Reid 2003). A strong 
commitment to local delivery of service should therefore become the guiding light 
of any further organisational change.
If a national police system is to be retained, it should be balanced by structures 
that reinforce both local delivery and local accountability. This could be made the 
joint responsibility of the PSA and local districts. The latter should also be given 
a role in local police finance by reintroducing a police precept, being involved in 
the choice of local commander and additionally a role in responding to public com-
plaints against the police. Most of these responsibilities have been accorded to PCCs 
in England and Wales while a number have already expanded their role to include 
engagement within the complaints process. The importance of transparency in the 
complaints process was recognised by Theresa May when Home Secretary when she 
agreed to public hearings in police complaints cases. This may serve to challenge an 
organisational culture that can encourage both professional dominance and a degree 
of opacity which might be seen as quite foreign to any advanced European democ-
racy (Reiner 2010: 216).
Convention of constabulary independence
It may now also be appropriate to begin challenge the convention of constabulary 
independence or, at least, how this is interpreted within the police service. At its 
most basic operational independence should mean that no politician is able to tell 
the police who they should arrest. Thereafter, the convention may need clarification. 
This is because the police service has over the recent past sought to expand its remit 
to the extent that any effective oversight has proved difficult to sustain (Loveday and 
Reid 2003). The lack of oversight has within some police forces had unfortunate 
consequences as exampled by South Yorkshire Police and the Hillsborough disaster 
(Loveday 2012).
There is a clear need to engage with the police force and this is, in England and 
Wales, now being actively encouraged by the Home Secretary. The convention of 
constabulary independence has been, however, most recently subject to review by 
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the English courts. In a recent case involving the former chief constable of South 
Yorkshire, the Court of Appeal was to find that the Police Reform and Social 
Responsibility Act 2011 in giving the PCC wide powers, overrode earlier protec-
tions provided by the 1964 Police Act and the Blackburn case to chief officers (see 
Regina –v- South Yorkshire PCC 2017).
A similar reorientation and engagement might be of value within the Scottish 
context. This is because much of what the police do (and don’t do) is and will remain 
highly political. It is therefore entirely appropriate that decisions over police pri-
orities and initiatives should be the subject of debate and contested when necessary. 
Moreover, the police service should no longer be able to evade public challenges 
by reference to the convention of constabulary independence. Recent experience of 
both the attitude and behaviour of the first Chief Constable of Police Scotland to his 
public duty of accountability to government bodies suggests there might be a ready 
agreement with this within both the political and public arena.
It remains the case that traditionally within the Scottish experience of policing 
there has been, in the past, a clear commitment to local democratic control of the 
police. As has been argued in relation to the Royal Burghs in the twentieth cen-
tury, there was a strong sense of civic pride and identity that was expressed through 
the ‘rhetoric of democracy in which it was argued that local police forces should 
be accountable to local people’ (Davidson et  al. 2016). As the same researchers 
suggest:
Sense of community was associated with local autonomy in opposition to 
the centralising state and was articulated through a sense of place. Moreover 
local meant ‘civic’. These beliefs, which were cultural and political, remained 
pretty much intact until the early 1960s. Supporters of amalgamation tended to 
make arguments that, in contrast, were financial and logistical (Davidson et al. 
2016).
Interestingly, many of those observers of the move to full amalgamation were to 
later declare that while they did not know of very many advocates of the single ser-
vice—‘it had proved to be a financial imperative which had driven it’ (Police Oracle 
2015c). The threat of financial cuts and a questionable defence by way of police 
establishment were indeed major drivers for Police Scotland. Together, these consti-
tuted the burial party for the last vestiges of local civic responsibility for the police 
service in Scotland. This has been, on balance, a singularly high price to pay for 
questionable efficiency savings and police specialisation upon which the argument 
for Police Scotland was to be based and, thereafter, defended.
Need for further restructuring
It is apparent that in relation to Police Scotland defending the current structure 
is not an option. There is a need to address the gaping democratic deficit created 
by the national police model which has effectively eradicated both local engage-
ment and the accountability of the police. As a result, some structural reform 
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will be needed and while politically it may prove difficult to admit to open fail-
ure it is clear that in the case of Police Scotland, further ‘fine tuning’ might be 
entirely appropriate.
How this takes shape will be the subject of debate but the problem of over-
centralisation of power occasioned by the creation of Police Scotland should be 
addressed. If this structure remains in place then strong local counterbalancing 
bodies should be contemplated. This is, however, never likely to be achieved by 
way of local ‘accountability panels’ proposed earlier by the First Minister.
A much more stable and meaningful basis for accountability will need to be 
created if local public opinion is to be satisfied. This could take the form of the 
resurrection of local Police Panels by each of the districts. They should work in 
partnership with other local services and be based on shared local boundaries. 
They should also be given a statutory responsibility for determining local police 
priorities and ensuring that local interests are not overridden by the Chief Con-
stable. Powers given to these bodies might include joint appointments of local 
commanders and some budgetary responsibilities. To entrench the element of 
local engagement, some thought might be given to replicating developments 
south of the border where elected authorities take up a more meaningful role in 
dealing with public complaints against the police.
The case for a regional tier of policing
It is also evident that given Scotland’s differing demography an intermedi-
ate regional police structure will need to be put in place. While localism and 
local delivery of policing is to be always preferred, it is clear that a regional 
tier of service delivery is needed. Here, the number of regional police com-
mands deemed to be appropriate would be subject to both public and profes-
sional debate. However, it would appear that the earlier concerns expressed by 
members of ACPOS prior to the creation of Police Scotland have proved to be 
entirely justified. As they argued, the absence of a regional tier of policing has 
indeed placed far too much responsibility on the shoulders of a remote central 
command structure (Fyfe 2014).
There should be a regional police command which would have the responsi-
bility for providing a platform for all strategic, blue light, emergency and other 
specialist services within the region. The logic of this proposal would be that a 
regional structure could be best able to reflect the different characteristics and 
demands that are reflected in a country the size of Scotland and which exhibits 
such differing social, economic and cultural characteristics.
Additionally, the 14 police divisions might benefit from further review. Here, the 
purpose would be to either reduce their number to conform to the proposed regional 
commands or to increase them to begin to establish coterminous boundaries with 
local authorities and upon which community safety partnerships might also be cre-
ated. This would be a potentially challenging exercise. However, in terms of deliver-
ing joined up service delivery at local level, it could well repay further investigation.
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Finally at national level, it is also apparent that significant reform is needed. 
This would initially involve the SPA itself. There must be some concern that the 
authority made responsible for holding the chief constable of police to account 
has itself, no claim to either democratic legitimacy or elected authority. Earlier 
experience of police authorities across the Border suggests that many often fail 
to exercise the limited powers they hold. As a vehicle for encouraging effective 
accountability, they proved to be highly flawed (Reiner 2010: 227). This feature 
of the police authority may have been replicated by the SPA.
Given this serious limitation, it might be of value to fully explore the signifi-
cantly greater powers given to Police and Crime Commissioners in England and 
Wales. They are of a nature and extent that transcends any powers given to police 
authorities in the past. As has been argued by one PCC, the power of general 
competence given to PCCs within the 2011 Police reform and Social Responsibil-
ity Act meant that elected PCCs ‘could in effect do anything that was lawful’. It is 
also significant that PCCs have been given responsibility for crime in their force 
areas. This has proved to be important in widening the remit of the PCC which 
goes well beyond that of accounting for only ‘policing’ (Hayes 2013).
Conclusion
Widening the powers of the SPA in line with those of PCCs to include respon-
sibility for crime would be of value as indeed might be introduction of direct 
election to that authority. However, in the absence of direct elections then repre-
sentation by indirect election should form the basis of a reformed SPA. Here, the 
future membership of the SPA might consist of representatives drawn from the 32 
districts. This would, at least, provide a real channel of communication for locally 
elected representatives who would be able to hold the chief constable to greater if 
not immediate account. It might also begin to address the significant democratic 
deficit occasioned by the creation of Police Scotland.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
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